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Abstract
In spite of being just a few years old, ransomware is quickly becoming a serious threat to our digital infrastructures, data
and services. Majority of ransomware families are requesting for a ransom payment to restore a custodian access or decrypt
data which were encrypted by the ransomware earlier. Although the ransomware attack strategy seems to be simple, security
specialists ranked ransomware as a sophisticated attack vector with many variations and families. Wide range of features
which are available in different families and versions of ransomware further complicates their detection and analysis. Though
the existing body of research provides significant discussions about ransomware details and capabilities, the all research
body is fragmented. Therefore, a ransomware feature taxonomy would advance cyber defenders’ understanding of associated
risks of ransomware. In this paper we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first scientific taxonomy of ransomware
features, aligned with Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model. CKC is a well-established model in industry that
describes stages of cyber intrusion attempts. To ease the challenge of applying our taxonomy in real world, we also provide the
corresponding ransomware defence taxonomy aligned with Courses of Action matrix (an intelligence-driven defence model).
We believe that this research study is of high value for the cyber security research community, as it provides the researchers
with a means of assessing the vulnerabilities and attack vectors towards the intended victims.
Keywords Ransomware · Taxonomy · Courses of Action Matrix · Cyber Kill Chain
1 Introduction
The fast growth in both number and types made ransomware
an imminent threat to our digital data [1]. On May 12,
2017, a ransomware called WannaCry (also known as Wan-
naCrypt) attacked thousands of users worldwide, particularly
UK National Health Service (NHS), making a chaos in
around 48 hospitals in the UK [2]. Ransomware, in general,
is a type of malware that removes authorised users’ access
to their data and returns it back only after making a payment
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(so-called ransom) [3]. Ransomware may meet its objec-
tive through encrypting victim’s files (crypto-ransomware)
or locking the victim machine (locker-ransomware). Either
way, ransomware would request the victims to pay the ran-
som to (possibly) retrieve their access to encrypted files or
locked systems.
The first ransomware, named AIDS Trojan, was introduced
in 1989. It was encrypting the victim’s files and asking for
money to decrypt the files [4]. Afterwards, there were reports
of occasional ransomware infections such as scareware,
GPCode and Reveton, which were trying to extort money
from their victims [4]. However, lack of an untraceable
payment method was the main barrier for attackers to anony-
mously receive ransom payment. Introduction and wide
adoption of cryto-currencies was the game changer. Crypto-
currency is a peer-to-peer electronic currency, where the
transactions are secured using cryptographic algorithms [5].
Bitcoin is the main representative of crypto-currency [6].
In 2013, CryptoLocker was probably the first family of
ransomware which efficiently leveraged a crypto-currency
(Bitcoin in this case) to receive ransom payment and became
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a role model for future ransomware families. Having an
anonymous, untraceable payment system and a proved work-
ing business model, exploded the digital world with tons
of different ransomware families. Each of the ransomware
families adopt variety of infection methods and payment
techniques!
Recently, ransomware has been one of the main areas
of research and several researchers proposed different ran-
somware detection methods (such as [7–13]). Meantime,
some researchers briefly discussed ransomware structure,
specification of some of the ransomware families and time-
line (such as [14–18]). However, specific features and
behaviour of the ransomware is not well-investigated and
well-documented yet. Though some phases of a ransomware
attack (e.g., delivery) is similar to other malware samples,
some other phases (such as its installation, propagation and
persistence) are different. We believe that, lack of a sys-
tematized and comprehensive reference detailing specific
features of ransomware is among important barriers in intro-
duction of effective preventive and detective methods. This
is due to the fact that security analysts would be able to detect
a ransomware attack in its early stages only if they are aware
of the specific features (e.g., weaponization, exploitation or
installation methods) of ransomware. A comprehensive tax-
onomy would help in differentiating between a ransomware
and other malware samples, classifying different ransomware
families based on their known features and providing dedi-
cated course of actions to each category.
This motivated us to provide, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first taxonomy of ransomware features. To this end,
we provide the reader with detailed information about ran-
somware lifecycle; enabling researchers to figure out how a
criminal delivers a ransomware (considering different fam-
ilies) and infects a victim, how ransomware hides itself, as
well as the actions that ransomware performs on the victim’s
machine. In order to provide such information in a more
understandable and systematized manner, we have adapted
the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) [19] model to
our ransomware feature taxonomy. CKC is a popular defence
model that was originally proposed as Intrusion Kill Chain
(IKC) [20] to describe phases of computer network intrusions
and later on adapted for defining the steps of a cyber attack.
Our motivation behind aligning our proposed taxonomy with
CKC model is to provide fine-grained information about each
step that the attacker must complete in order to achieve the
goal, as otherwise the attack would be failed. Our extracted
features in each step would enhance the security analyst’s
understanding about the evidences that he needs to look for
in order to detect the attack.
In order to provide the reader with a high level overview
of a ransomware lifecycle, Fig. 1 shows an example anatomy
of a Locky crypto-ransomware attack through a phishing
email (we follow the attack phases as explained in [21]).
In the first stage, the victim receives a legitimate looking
email (e.g., from a tax company, or a billing company),
which contains a URL to a legitimate-looking web site
which hosts attacker’s malicious payload, i.e., an exploit
kit or a weaponised Word document, etc. The attacker pay-
load downloads the ransomware (delivery phase) and either
launches the ransomware or scans victim machine for pos-
sible vulnerabilities, e.g., an out-dated unpatched software
that can be exploited to achieve required privilege to run the
ransomware (in the form of an .exe file in our example).
Upon execution on the victim machine, ransomware deletes
the Windows Shadow copies on the victim machine in order
to deny user’s access to the system backup files. Ransomware
also propagates itself in the file system and searches for
files with specific extensions, e.g., .jpg, .mpg, .zip, .bak,
.pptx, .doc, .pdf, .xls, etc., and starts encrypting files
on the victim machine. Once the encryption process is com-
pleted successfully, ransomware connects to a Command
and Control server (C&C, also named C2)1 to upload the
encryption key and host-specific information and to receive
ransom payment instructions. Afterwards, the attacker noti-
fies the victim with the payment information, and in most
cases activates a countdown clock. If the victim decides to
make the ransom payment, occasionally ransomware con-
tinues with downloading the decryption key from the C&C
server and decrypts the victim data (although in the absence
of follow-up security improvements it is just matter of time
that the same or different ransomware infects the machine
again). If the victim decides not to pay the ransom, then ran-
somware deletes the decryption key and makes the recovery
of data close to impossible! It is notable that different fam-
ilies of ransomware may offer different features, hence not
exactly following all stages described in the above example.
This further underlines the need for a systematized taxonomy
of the ransomware features.
Contribution In this paper, in order to help researchers
and security analysts in understanding the architecture of
crypto-ransomware and finding efficient detection mecha-
nisms, we provide a systematized analysis and taxonomy of
crypto-ransomware features. It is notable that our focus in
this paper is only on the ransomware families that target per-
sonal computers. Although, some features of ransomware
families targeting mobile phones and IoT devices are differ-
ent from those that target personal computers, there are some
similarities; we leave this discussion as a future work. As a
systematization methodology, we consider Lockheed Martin
Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) framework [19,20] and align the
behaviour of crypto-ransomware with the offensive steps of
1 A machine that is controlled by the attacker which is used to com-
municate with the compromised system and send different malicious
commands.
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Fig. 1 An example scenario of a Locky ransomware attack anatomy
a cyber intrusion as described in CKC framework (which
we explain in Sect. 2). Our proposed taxonomy could be
used by many organizations which are using CKC in their
day-by-day cyber defence planning to address risk of ran-
somware attacks by finding out what are the points of attacks
and features of the ransomware that they should look for in
their analysis. After obtaining such information about the
structure of the intrusion, the reader needs to know how to
defend against each phase of the intrusion attempt. In line
with Lockheed Martin Course of Action (CoA) matrix [20],
we provide required information for the defenders in taking
appropriate actions.
It is worth mentioning that the fragmentation of scientific
research on ransomware and lack of coherent investigation
methodology on ransomware was our main challenge in this
research, which led to relying more on the industrial refer-
ences, along with scientific research papers.
Organization The remaining of the paper is organized as
follows: In Sect. 2 we provide the required background
knowledge on the CKC framework, which we used as and
CoA defence model. We present our taxonomy of crypto-
ransomware features in Sect. 3. We provide the ransomware
defence overview in Sect. 4 which briefly overviews the exist-
ing solutions to prevent/detect the ransomware attacks, as
well as show casing course of action for some well-known
ransomware families. In Sect. 5, we survey the most related
research studies to our work. Finally, Sect. 6 highlights pos-
sible future research directions.
2 Background on Cyber Kill Chain and
Courses of Actions Matrix
Intrusion Kill Chain (IKC), also known as Cyber Kill Chain
(CKC), is suggested in 2011 by Lockheed Martin and
then widely accepted in the industry for modeling intru-
sion attempts from attackers prospective [22]. The CKC
model is used to develop (threat) intelligence about attackers’
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and attack attri-
bution [20]. Many researchers have adopted the original CKC
model [20] to identify, protect and mitigate against intru-
sions and malware samples, such as [22]. However, some
other researchers [23] adapted the original definition of CKC
model to their own requirements and proposed different steps
in cyber attack chain model.
CKC devises seven steps for attackers to achieve their
objectives (see Fig. 2), namely (1) Reconnaissance, (2)
Weaponization, (3) Delivery, (4) Exploitation, (5) Instal-
lation, (6) Command and Control, and (7) Actions on
Objectives.
1. Reconnaissance In this step attackers try to collect as
much information as possible about their targets to devise
a robust attack. During reconnaissance, attackers may
123
T. Dargahi et al.
Fig. 2 Lockheed Martin Cyber
Kill Chain (CKC) [22] seven
steps. The part that is specified
with the red rectangle highlights
six steps that we considered in
our ransomware feature
taxonomy
Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation Command &
Control
Actions on
Objectives
Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) seven steps
Our considered steps for Ransomware feature taxonomy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EXE
C&C
Install
harvest a range of information from target mailing lists,
presence in social media, open ports to potential vul-
nerabilities in target services and applications. Collected
information are usually used to decide about best tool
of attack (i.e., a targeted exploit, an exploit kit or a
worm) to successfully penetrate into target environment
and achieve attack objectives.
2. Weaponization During weaponization, attackers armor
their malicious payload with means of by-passing secu-
rity controls in the target environment (i.e., for a smooth
execution) [20]. They use a range of techniques from dis-
guising a malware in a benign looking payload, such as
Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft
Office documents, to exploiting a remote-access O-day
vulnerability2 to disable target machine security pro-
tections, such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP),
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) or Anti-
Viruses [25].
3. Delivery Regardless of how sophisticated and robust is
a weaponized malicious payload, an attacker should find
a way to get it delivered to the intended target(s). In the
delivery step, attackers are formulating possible means,
e.g., through malicious email attachments or USB flash
drive, to convey their malware [20].
4. Exploitation Exploitation is when the robber meets the
road. This is when the armored payload exploits a vul-
nerability on the target environment and executes its
malicious binary payload and provides the attacker with
minimum required access to the target environment.
Introduction of Crimeware-as-a-Service (CaaS) further
reduced attackers hassle at this stage.
5. Installation In this step, attackers try to further their
access to more nodes (i.e., propagating the malware in
the network) and install remote administration tools, i.e.,
Remote Access Trojans (RAT) or Backdoors to persist
their presence on the target environment [20].
2 O-day vulnerability, also known as zero-day vulnerability, refers to a
security vulnerability in a software that is still unpatched by the software
vendor which can be exploited by the criminals in order to get access
to the target system [24].
Phase Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive Destroy
Reconnaissance
Weaponization
Delivery
Exploitation
Installation
C&C
Actions on 
Objectives
Fig. 3 Lockheed Martin course of actions matrix [22]. The rows specify
the CKC seven steps, while the columns specify the corresponding
defensive actions
6. Command and Control (C&C, or C2) After being
installed on the victim machine(s), it is time for attack-
ers to have their (virtual) hands on the target keyboards
through setting up a remote Command and Control
(C&C, also known as C2). The C2 channels can be used
to deliver attackers commands to the malware or exfiltrate
data from the target environment.
7. Actions on Objectives Finally, after successful installa-
tion, and C&C establishment, it is time to perform desired
action(s) to meet the attack objectives. Attackers could
have different objectives from just accessing and exfiltrat-
ing private information to encrypting files and denying
custodians access to their data [20].
Based on all the information obtained about the intrusion
and the phases that the intrusion undertakes to infect the vic-
tim, Courses of Action (CoA) Matrix provides the defenders
with a model for intelligent actions against each of these
phases [20]. In particular, by mapping each of the seven
phases of the CKC to corresponding actions, i.e., detect,
deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive and destroy (see Fig. 3), a
security analyst can define, in each cell, which security mea-
sures should be considered in order to defend against each
phase of the CKC.
In this paper, we take advantage of the CKC model and
CoA matrix to provide a systematic analysis of ransomware
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Ransomware Features
Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation Command and Control
Actions on 
Objectives
Script-based 
Ransomware
Encryption Method 
Diversification
Delivery Payload 
Diversification
File Access Pattern  
Diversification
Evasion 
Techniques
Social 
Engineering
Malvertisement
Traffic Distribution 
System
Timing-based
Data 
Code
Network
Exploit Kit Infected Host
Infected Network
Hard-coded IP 
Address
Domain 
Generation 
Ransom Payment
Phishing
Spear-phishing 
Targeted 
Exploitation
Existing Botnet
Access 
Denying
Backup 
Encryption
Remote 
Desktop
Server 
Message Block
Fig. 4 Our proposed CKC-based taxonomy diagram of the ransomware features
features and possible defence methods. As highlighted in
the literature [23,26], all of the seven steps of the CKC
model are not applicable to all attack scenarios, so we adapt
only those steps that are applicable to the ransomware con-
text. Specifically reconnaissance is a pre-attack step in which
the attacker identifies the victim or possible vulnerabilities,
hence, is not applicable to ransomware; we skip this step and
start our analysis from weaponization and go through deliv-
ery, exploitation, installation, C2 and actions on objectives. In
ransomware intrusions, similar to any other attacks, intruders
spend significant amount of time on collecting information
about their targets (especially in the case of targeted ran-
somware) to develop an effective ransomware [27]. However,
majority of reconnaissance activities are conducted prior to
a ransomware release, hence there is not a feature in the
ransomware samples corresponding to reconnaissance activ-
ities.
3 Ransomware features taxonomy
This section provides a taxonomy of ransomware features
based on the CKC model starting from the weaponization
step. Figure 4 shows our proposed taxonomy of ransomware
features and the specific methods adopted by attackers in each
step of a ransomware attack. We discuss all the details in this
section. To further highlight the benefit of having such a tax-
onomy, we consider 12 well-known families of ransomware
(based on the Ransomware Tracker portal3) and provide a
3 https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/tracker.
mapping between our proposed taxonomy and features of
those 12 ransomware families in Table 1.
3.1 Weaponization
Ransomware developers employ a variety of techniques to
weaponize their samples and evade memory-based, file-
based and network-based cyber defence mechanisms. We
extracted five main weaponization techniques, i.e., embed-
ding commands within a script, delivery payload diversi-
fying, file access pattern diversifying, encryption method
diversifying, and using different evasion techniques (time-
based, data-based, code-based, and network-based). We
detail all these techniques in the following.
3.1.1 Script-based ransomware
Script-based ransomware encrypts victim’s data through exe-
cuting commands embedded within a script. Script-based
ransomware usually removes the original script file upon
completing the encryption process and the malware opcodes
would only resists in-memory. These kind of malware
samples are also known as file-less or in-memory-only mal-
ware [28]. Fewer residual evidences of script-based malware
make them a more stealthier option for attackers target-
ing high profile victims [29,30]. Moreover, as script-based
ransomware samples do not require installation, it is eas-
ier for them to bypass host-level control and infect limited
privileged users. Majority of script-based ransomware sam-
ples are written in JavaScript (JS), PHP, PowerShell, and
Python [31]. As listed in Table 1, TeslaCrypt, TorrentLocker,
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Locky, PayCrypt, DMALocker, Cerber and Sage use script-
based weaponization method.
3.1.2 Delivery payload diversification
With increasing deployment of web-based anti-malware
solutions and users’ security awareness, it is becoming very
difficult for malicious actors to successfully infect a victim
by directly sending an executable file. Most of the mali-
cious files are now embedding themselves within benign
looking payloads, such as MS Word or Video files, to fool
the anti-malware products. Ransomware leverages a vari-
ety of different delivery payloads to bypass anti-malware
protections and convince users to run the malicious code.
For example, CryptoWall [32] ransomware samples use SVG
(Scalable Vector Graphic) files as their delivery payload,
Marlboro [33] uses Microsoft Word files, Spora uses ZIP
file including HTA (HTML Application) files [34] and Cer-
ber v6 uses SFX (self-extracting archives) files as deliverable
containing VBS and DLL (Dynamic Link Library) files [35].
More interestingly, different versions of Locky use a variety of
delivery payloads ranging from weaponized Microsoft Word
files to nested Word documents which are dropped by open-
ing a PDF file or DLL or HTA files [36]. Diversified delivery
payloads that are used in Locky samples, made Locky as one
of the most successful ransomware families.
3.1.3 Diversifying file access patterns
Various ransomware families have a very similar pattern of
interactions with the file system. They usually open a file and
load its content first, then start encrypting. Such a predictable
pattern has been used by different anti-malware solutions to
thwart ransomware attacks. Therefore, ransomware develop-
ers tried to diversify their ransomware file access and file
system interaction patterns. Cryptolocker and CryptoWall
ransomware families directly overwrite the encrypted data on
the same data buffer [14]. While, Reveton, Gpcode, Urausy,
and Filecoder ransomware families delete the original files by
removing their entries from MFT (Master File Table). Some
Locky samples change file extensions to .locky, while Cryp-
toWall changes the file extension to .crypt, and TeslaCrypt
changes the encrypted file extension to .ecc, .ezz, .exx,
.xyz, .zzz. As listed in Table 1 TeslaCrypt, CryptoWall,
TorrentLocker, PadCrypt, Locky, CTB-Locker, FAKBEN, Pay-
Crypt, Sage and GlobeImposter use this weaponization
method.
3.1.4 Diversifying data encryption methods
Ransomware families are either using a standard encryp-
tion module or their own customized encryption method to
encrypt the victim’s data. Majority of those ransomware sam-
ples that use standard encryption algorithms utilise built-in
operating system features or an API (Application Program-
ming Interface) for encryption [7]. For example, Cerber v6
takes advantage of Windows CryptoAPI, while Petya uses
CryptGenRandom API to generate data encryption key [37].
The standard encryption modules that are used by ran-
somware families could be divided into the following three
categories [4,7]:
– Asymmetric Encryption: Some ransomware families use
public/private key cryptography to encrypt victim’s data,
such as CryptoWall that uses RSA [38]. In these fami-
lies, the encryption keys are either generated directly on
the victim’s machine, as used by WannaCry ransomware,
or delivered through C&C channel, as used by Locky
ransomware, or embedded in the binary, as used by Tes-
laCrypt ransomware [38];
– Symmetric Encryption: This method is mostly used with
the encryption key embedded in the malware. Differ-
ent families of ransomware adopt different symmetric
encryption methods as well as patterns, e.g., UIWIX first
encrypts data with AES-256 in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) followed by an RC4 encryption [39], and Bucbi
ransomware uses a less-known encryption method named
GOST [40];
– Hybrid Techniques: Such methods first use symmetric
key algorithms, e.g., AES-256 and CBC, to encrypt the
victim’s files/system. Then, they use asymmetric encryp-
tion methods, e.g., RSA-1024, RSA-2048, or ECC, to
encrypt the symmetric key. These techniques are used by
several ransomware families such as CryptoLocker and
Spora [34]. In hybrid techniques, usually the criminals
embed the RSA public key inside the malicious binary
payload and so they do not need to communicate with
C2 in order to retrieve the encryption key. Therefore,
when the victim pays the ransom, the criminals use the
corresponding RSA private key in order to decrypt user
files/system.
Usage of standard cryptographic algorithms and APIs is
a convenient way for the attackers to encrypt victim’s data;
however, execution of too many APIs for a large amount
of data requires admin privilege which is not always the
case for a ransomware attack. This limits the number of
machines/files that a ransomware could target. Moreover,
it is trivial for anti-malware systems to monitor or limit
privileged users’ access to Crypto APIs, which leads to fail-
ure of ransomware execution. Therefore, some families of
ransomware use a customized ecnryption mechanism. For
example, Mischa uses a randomly generated key as a seed for
an XOR operation to encrypt victim’s data [37]. Diversify-
ing encryption techniques and limiting the usage of standard
cryptographic APIs could be considered as evasion technique
123
A Cyber-Kill-Chain based taxonomy of crypto-ransomware features
for those anti-malware products that rely on detection of stan-
dard crypto API activities.
3.1.5 Evasion techniques
Evasion techniques enable a malicious program to bypass
security controls such as network border defence mech-
anisms and host-level protections. We consider evasion
techniques under weaponization category as they extend
offensive capabilities of malicious programs. Evasion tech-
niques that are commonly adopted by ransomware can
be divided into four categories: (a) Timing-based evasion
techniques, (b) Data evasion techniques, (c) Code evasion
techniques, and (d) Network evasion techniques. In what fol-
lows, we first explain the main idea behind each of these
categories and then discuss how they have been used by dif-
ferent families of ransomware.
1- Timing-based Evasion Techniques One of the most com-
mon evasion techniques used by malware samples to evade
detection is timing-based evasion, which refers to running
at a specific time/date. Also some malware samples mea-
sure the time it takes to run the code, which helps them to
undesrtand if they are run inside a debugger [41]. Similar to
the other malware samples, some of the ransomware fam-
ilies also adopt timing-based evasion techniques [42]. We
divide the techniques used by ransomware in two categories
as follows.
– Delayed Execution: Several researchers have extensively
considered “continuous profile of conducting a malicious
activity” as a method for malware detection [43]. In the
case of ransomware, the fact that almost all ransomware
applications encrypt users’ data can be considered as a
behavioural factor to detect their execution [9]. Major-
ity of ransomware families, such as Locky, CryptoWall,
TeslaCrypt, TorrentLocker, and CTB-Locker, encrypt
intended contents in one go. Therefore, researchers con-
sidered user continuous file encryption activities as an
element to detect and stop ransomware attacks [44]. How-
ever, several ransomware families such as KeRanger,
Reveton, CryptXXX, or Cerber include some delays of
few minutes to even a few days between their encryption
attempts in order to evade detection [45,46].
– Event-based Execution: Some ransomware families remain
dormant on the system to find the most vulnerable
moment (i.e., being idle for a longtime) or for a specific
event on the system (i.e., an admin user logon or a sys-
tem reboot) to start their attack. For example, versions
of KeRanger ransomware are triggered upon execution
of OS X Time Machine backup in an attempt to encrypt
backup data as well [47].
2- Data Evasion Techniques Basically, malware data eva-
sion techniques focus on removing remnants of malicious
activities; hence making it more difficult to trace a malware
or detect its presence on a machine. Different ransomware
families use variety of data evasion techniques, out of which
we explain the representative ones in the following.
– Self-deleting/Self-destruction: Some malware samples
are armored with self-deleting features to delete their
traces on an infected machine [48]. By removing the
traces of its existence, a malware evades detection by
anti-malware products and further complicates foren-
sics investigation tasks. Some ransomware families such
as Cerber v6, Locky, CryptoWall, and TeslaCrypt are
equipped with self-deleting features and remove mali-
cious executable files from infected machines [46].
– Anti-dump Techniques: Generally, malware codes are
weaponized (e.g., packed) in such a way that makes
it difficult for security analysts to reverse the com-
piled code. Even the most armored codes should be
decrypted/unpacked in the memory, so the instructions
(op codes) can be executed by the CPU [49]. One method
to analyse an armored malware is to dump the pro-
cess from the memory and then analyse the malware
code [48,50]. Usually, in order to mislead such an analy-
sis, cybercriminals utilize anti-dump techniques such as
modifying/erasing the PE (Portable Executable) header,
or loading different parts of a binary on different memory
locations (this technique is called “stolen bytes”) [50]. It
might be even possible to find decryption key of a ran-
somware by dumping its process memory as reported
in [51] for Chimera ransomware investigation. Hence,
several families of ransomware such as TeslaCrypt and
CTB Locker are weaponized by anti-dump features to
evade any forensics attempt.
– Creating Alternate Data Streams: Alternate Data Streams
(ADS) introduced into the Windows XP SP2 NTFS in
order to provide compatibility between the file system
of Mac and Windows. Basically, ADS provides infor-
mation for the operating system about the attributes of
a file and how associated data to the ADS should be
used [52,53]. However, several malware authors have
used ADS in order to associate a hidden malicious exe-
cutable to a legitimate file in order to infect a target
system, while evading detection by anti-malware prod-
ucts and analysts [52,53]. For example a .txt file can be
associated with a malicious .exe ADS file which can be
executed directly without the need to have a starter code
in the main data stream [54]. Some of the ransomware
families such as TeslaCrypt[55] have used ADS in order
to bypass detection.
– Deleting Zone Identifier: The “zone identifier” is a spe-
cial ADS for files stored on an NTFS partition which
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specifies the origin of a file [56]. For example, Win-
dows Internet Explorer uses Zone.Identifier “local
Intranet”, “trusted sites”, “Internet”, “restricted sites”,
or “local machine” as zone identifiers [57,58]. This
Zone.Identifier information helps malware ana-
lysts to speculate about the origin of a malware. There-
fore, malware developers are commonly changing the
Zone.Identifier allocated to their files, i.e., from
“Internet” to “trusted”, to further complicate malware
tracing activities [58]. Similarly, some ransomware fam-
ilies, such as TeslaCrypt [59] and Locky [60], delete the
Zone.Identifier to make it more difficult for an ana-
lyst to detect the origin of a ransomware.
3- Code Evasion Techniques Cybercriminals adopt several
techniques in order to armor their malicious codes against
reverse engineering to further complicate malware analysis
task [48]. In what follows, we explain different code evasion
techniques that are used by ransomware families.
– Anti-debugging Techniques: Debugger is a tool or a pro-
gram that inspects other programs interactions with CPU
while they are being executed and loaded in memory.
There are several anti-debugging techniques (e.g., using
HEAP flags, or winAPI [61]) that usually ransomware
uses to detect if a debugger is attached or injected to its
code [62,63]. Moreover, mere detection of execution of a
known debugger, such as OllyDBG [64], or a debugging
related process (such as procexp.exe, regedit,
or msconfig) may cause some ransomware samples
to avoid execution or to kill the debugging process
prior to launching their malicious binary payload [65].
Majority of ransomware families, such as JIGSAW [66],
TeslaCrypt, CTB-Locker, Locky, CryptoWall, and Tor-
rentLocker, leverage anti-debugging techniques.
– Anti-disassembly Techniques: One of the malware anal-
ysis methods is reverse engineering the malware code by
loading the malware into a disassembler [48]. Malware
authors adopt several anti-disassembling methods (such
as junk/dead code insertion or payload obfuscation and
encryption) in order to defeat reverse engineers [48,67].
In a method called “dead code insertion”, several simple
or complex code sequences and branches with no execu-
tion effects are included in several parts of the code [68].
Moreover, packing a malware by encrypting or obfuscat-
ing its executable payload may significantly increase its
analysis time [69,70].
Ransomware authors use anti-disassembly techniques to
complicate static analysis and reversing tasks. For exam-
ple, CryptoWall v3, CrypVault, Cerber, and Petya insert
junk code in between the real code stream in order to
make reverse engineering difficult [37,55,71,72]. More-
over, CryptXXX, Cerber, Locky, Teerac, Crysis, Cryp-
toWall, and CTB-Locker ransomware families use pack-
ing techniques [70,73]. CryptoWall v3 ransomware [55]
also uses hidden internal PE (i.e., a malicious portable
executable file hidden in a legitimate file) as an anti-
disassembly technique. Examples of ransomware fami-
lies that adopt payload encryption/obfuscation are Cryp-
toBit ransomware (which XORs the payload), Cerber
5.0.1 ransomware (in which the payload is encrypted
using RC4 encryption method), and Locky ransomware
that adopts XOR obfuscation and reversing bytes order
of the payload [74–76].
– Anti-sandboxing Techniques: Isolated environments, such
as virtual machines (VMs) or sandboxes, are very popular
among malware researchers to run and inspect unknown
(and possibly malicious) programs [67,77]. Majority
of ransomware families, such as Cerber SFX, Cerber
v6, UIWIX, WannaCry, and CryptXXX, check if they
are running within an isolated environment and if so
self-terminate or leave dormant [2,35,39,45,46]. These
anti-sandboxing techniques are either timing-based or
artifact-based [61,78]. In the timing-based techniques,
the attacker checks the Time Stamp Counter (TSC) reg-
ister to access the count of CPU cycles in order to
detect the difference between normal execution count
and execution in a virtual environment [79]. While, in
the artifact-based techniques, a malware recognizes if it
is running in a virtual environment by checking the MAC
address of the host machine from the registry, or checking
the running processes on the host machine [67].
– Polymorphism and Metamorphism: Malware authors uti-
lize these two features to evade signature-based malware
detection by making small and interim changes in char-
acteristics of the malware (usually within a specific
malware family). The “polymorphic” behaviour is the
capability of self-mutation by the usage of encryp-
tion (i.e., in each execution of the file, the malware
mutates its static binary code using a different encryp-
tion key), leading to variety of signatures for the same
malware [69]. The “metamorphic” behaviour refers to
continuous reprogramming of the malware in every exe-
cution iteration/distribution in order to change the mal-
ware signature [69,80]. Several families of ransomware,
such as Reveton, Winlock, and Urausy, adopt polymor-
phic techniques to evade detection [14].
4- Network Evasion Techniques Network defence tools,
such as Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IDS/IPS), rely on either signature-based or anomaly-based
techniques to detect malicious programs [81]. Signature-
based detection techniques rely on predefined patterns
(signatures) of known attack traffic, while anomaly-based
detection techniques look for out-of-norm network traffic
for detecting malicious activities. Signature-based detection
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techniques are pretty efficient against known attacks detec-
tion, but incapable of detecting unseen attacks. Anomaly-
based detection techniques are having a very high false-
positive, while they might be able to detect unforeseen attacks
as well [82]. Ransomware developers utilize different tech-
niques to deceive network-based defence mechanisms [83]
as we discuss in the following.
– Network Traffic Encryption: Encrypting network traffic
would blind majority of network defence solutions and
allows communication between the victim device and
the C&C server to remain undetected. Several families
of ransomware adopt such methods to evade detection.
For example, CryptoWall (which encrypts the communi-
cation with RC4 encryption algorithm) [55] and Locky
ransomware [60].
– Utilizing Traffic Anonymizers: Traffic anonymizers, such
as TOR, encrypt the communication between two end-
points and forward the traffic through several relay nodes
in order to evade attempts for detecting an attack ori-
gin. Some families of ransomware, such as CTBLocker
and Onion ransomware, communicate with the C2 server
through TOR anonymous networks [84,85]. CryptoWall
v3 ransomware uses I2P network proxies to communi-
cate with the C2 server and uses Tor network for ransom
payments [86], while Locky ransomware uses TOR for
the payment [60].
– Domain Shadowing: Cybercriminals may steal creden-
tials of legitimate registered domains, e.g., GoDaddy, in
order to create a large number of sub-domains, which
are mapped to their malicious server(s) [87]. Domain
shadowing evades detection by rotating sub-domains
associated with a malicious server hosting attackers’ con-
tent [87]. Especially those families of ransomware that
are delivered through exploit kits (EK) utilize domain
shadowing technique, e.g., Cryptowall v3 and TeslaCrypt
v2 ransomware, that are delivered by the Angler EK [88].
– Fast Flux: In this evasion method, the IP address associ-
ated with a single domain or DNS record mapped to the
domain rotates in a list of IP addresses to protect against
detecting live malicious IP tied to a specific malware
campaign at a given time [87]. This technique evades
IP black listing defence mechanisms and has been uti-
lized in several ransomware campaigns, such as versions
of WannaCry ransomware hosted on Avalanche’s infras-
tructure [89].
3.2 Delivery
Even the best weaponised malware should find a way to be
delivered to the intended targets. Ransomware uses a variety
of delivery techniques as we will discuss in this section.
3.2.1 Social engineering
Social engineering is a technique used by attackers to moti-
vate a human being to trust the attacker and take attackers’
desired actions, such as clicking on a link or revealing sen-
sitive information. Though, there are several definitions for
social engineering [90–92], all of them, more or less, express
the same message that the attackers adopt different psycho-
logical (e.g., impersonation, or friendship) or physical (e.g.,
workplace, phone, or on-line) tricks to obtain sensitive infor-
mation (e.g., password) [90]. Social engineering is one of
the most common delivery methods used by malware sam-
ples and well adopted by ransomware as well. Ransomware
attackers adopt different methods of social engineering in
order to deliver the malware to the victim and conduct
planned malicious actions as described in the following [4].
Phising Phishing, in general, is an attempt to convince the
victims to share their sensitive information, such as user name
and password, or credit card information. Phishing can be
performed through several ways, such as spam emails, instant
messaging, or even phone calls [93,94]. Phishing messages
are claimed to be from a trusted organization, such as a bank
or a shipping company and are not targeted to a specific group
of people.
Several families of ransomware use phishing methods in
order to encourage victims to visit an infected website or
download an attachment through which a malicious payload
containing ransomware will be delivered to the victim device.
Trend Micro [36] reported that around 71% of ransomware
families are delivered to victims through spam emails. The
criminals use a variety of email subjects in order to convince
the victim to open the email, such as banking notifica-
tion, invoices, item delivery and so on [36]. An example of
ransomware delivered through phishing is Locky. This ran-
somware was sending phishing emails pretending to be sent
from the government tax companies, such as British HMRC,
French Impots, and Australian MyGov [95]. Other examples
of ransomware delivered by phishing are, but not limited
to, SamSam, Cryptolocker, TeslaCrypt, Cerber, and Marl-
boro [33,96–99].
Spear-phishing Compared to the phishing method, spear-
phishing is a targeted phishing attack by which the cyber-
criminals attempt to gain access to sensitive information of a
specific group of users, e.g., employees of a critical organi-
zation [94]. In order to perform a successful spear-phishing,
the attacker generally performs careful reconnaissance and
gathers as much information as possible about the victim, for
example, through social networks (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn,
etc.) [100].
The most popular ransomware delivery method is spear-
phishing where a criminal: (i) uses emails to send ran-
123
T. Dargahi et al.
somware as an attachment (e.g., Spora [34]), (ii) posts
web-links to infected websites hosting the ransomware (e.g.,
TeslaCrypt [38]), or (iii) uses links to a cloud storage
hosting ransomware, e.g., “Dropbox” links used to deliver
Petya [101], and Cerber [102] ransomwares, and “1fichier”
cloud storage used to deliver JIGSAW ransomware [66].
When user downloads an attachment or clicks on the link, the
ransomware drops itself to the machine and usually surround-
ing story crafted as part of spear-phishing encourages users
to open the attachment or attackers’ reconnaissance knowl-
edge already provides means to auto-start the ransomware at
the background.
3.2.2 Malvertisement
In this method, criminals run an advertisement campaign on a
(legitimate) website which redirects users to attackers owned
domains by clicking on the advert link, where a ransomware
will be dropped to the victim machine. Malvertisement cam-
paigns infected many famous websites including New York
Times and BBC [103]. In case of ransomware, upon click-
ing, the victim is redirected to an infected website hosting
ransomware or an exploit kit that finds vulnerabilities in the
victim system and installs the ransomware. For example, Cer-
ber ransomware malvertisement campaign redirects users to
Manitude, Rig, Neutrino, and Sundown exploit kits [46].
3.2.3 Traffic distribution system
Traffic Distribution System (TDS) redirects web traffic of
a legitimate web site to a malicious web site which is
hosting attackers’ contents (an exploit kit, malware, or ran-
somware) [104]. In this method of delivery, instead of
infecting a web site or purchasing an infected web server,
an attacker buys redirected traffic of a legitimate web site
(which usually hosts adult content, video streaming or gam-
ing services) from a TDS vendor and redirects it to his
malicious web sites [105]. This web site usually hosts a
drive-by-download ransomware that will be delivered to the
victim machine later on [105]. Several ransomware cam-
paigns deliver their malicious payload using TDS, e.g.,
Locky ransomware that is distributed through Nuclear exploit
kit [106]. In this example, when the victim visits a com-
promised website, he/she is redirected to a TDS, which
accordingly redirects the user to the attacker’s exploit kit
landing page.
3.3 Exploitation
After delivering the malicious payload, ransomware needs
to find a way to launch itself on the victim machine. This
usually happens through exploiting a vulnerability on the
target environment by utilizing an exploit kit or launching a
targeted exploit.
3.3.1 Exploit kits
Exploit Kit (EK) refers to a hacking software toolkit that
cybercriminals use in order to scan a target machine for pos-
sible vulnerabilities (e.g., unpatched software) and exploit
those vulnerabilities in order to launch a malware and infect
the victim machine [107]. Attackers lure or redirect victims
to domains that host their EKs where the victim machine’s
existing vulnerabilities (e.g., unpatched Adobe Flash) are
detected and exploited to provide a foothold on the com-
promised machine. Gained foothold can be used to launch
intended malicious payload [108]. Growing trend in provid-
ing exploit-as-a-service in black market enables criminals to
easily purchase an EK and equip it with their desired ran-
somware payload [3,109].
Exploit kits are among the most common methods for
launching a ransomware on the victim machines. The Angler
EK, which exploits unpatched Adobe Flash and Microsoft
Silverlight, has been used by several ransomware families
such as CrypWall, TeslaCrypt, Crilock, and Waltrix [107,
109]. The Neutrino and Magnitude EKs that target unpatched
Adobe Flash are used to execute CrypWall and Cerber ran-
somwares [107]. The Rig and Sundown EKs, which target
vulnerable Microsoft Silverlight versions, are used to launch
TeslaCrypt, Cerber, and CryptoShocker [107]. The Nuclear
EK, which compromises vulnerable installation of Adobe
Flash, is used to drop and run TeslaCrypt, Locky, CRYPCTB,
and CRYPSHED ransomwares [107,109]. The Blackhole EK,
which targets vulnerabilities of Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash
and Java, is leveraged to deliver CryptoLocker and Reveton
ransomwares [107,110,111].
3.3.2 Targeted exploitation
While EKs mainly target mass users, many of successful
ransomware attacks are on the basis of attackers’ previous
reconnaissance of the victim environment and development
of a customized targeted exploit that runs on the intended
victims’ machine and launches the ransomware. Targeted
ransomware attacks are rising very quickly and become
an imminent threat to enterprises [27]. The SamSam ran-
somware was probably the most widely known targeted
ransomware [112]. More recently, Petya ransomware (later
on announced as a wiper) also targeted specific vulnerabilties
on its initial launch [113].
3.4 Installation
After being successfully launched on the victim machine dur-
ing the “exploitation” step, the next phase in the life-cycle of a
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ransomware attack is installation of the malicious binary pay-
load on the victim environment. As part of installation, some
families of ransomware connect to C2 server and receive
encryption instructions (such as CryptoWall ransomware),
while others may start encryption without a C2 connection
(such as SamSam ransomware). Moreover, some families of
ransomware, such as WannaCry, may act as a worm and start
distributing themselves on the other nodes available on the
local network. Hence, installation of a ransomware can be
divided into two phases which may perform concurrently:
(1) Installation on the infected host, and (2) Installation on
the target network.
3.4.1 Installation on the infected host
In this phase, ransomware launches its malicious binary pay-
load on the infected host and not only encrypts residual files
on the victim machine but also installs itself on any accessible
backup version and encrypts them as well.
Making Files Unavailable Different ransomware samples
take different approaches for making users’ files unavail-
able. Some ransomware families only encrypt user’s data and
deny user’s access to his/her files. Encryption could be lim-
ited to specific files on the target, or specific file types (such
as images, videos, Office files, or PDF files) or even files
with specific properties (i.e., with specific size or creation
date) [7]. Other ransomware families, such as Bart, may just
archive a user’s files to a password protected repository dur-
ing installation [114]. However, in all aforementioned cases,
victim is still able to use the infected machine, e.g., for pay-
ing the ransom. On the other side, some ransomware families,
such as HDDCryptor [115], Mamba [116], Santa [117] and
Petya [101], take a more intrusive approach and encrypt the
whole hard disk of the victim machine and make the sys-
tem completely unavailable. As these ransomware families
encrypt Master Boot Record (MBR), they are known as “boot
lockers” as well.
Encryption of Backup or Recovery Data During installation,
majority of ransomware families try to infect any acces-
sible backup storage (e.g., USB drive, external hard drive
and cloud storage [97]), remove available restore files and
delete all the VSCs (Volume Shadow Copies)4. For exam-
ple, CryptoLocker, Locky, and PadCrypt ransomwares adopt
this method [118]. Some other variants of ransomware dis-
able Windows Startup Repair, and change Boot Status Policy,
such as Spora ransomware [34]. In fact, criminals behind
ransomware try to maximize their gain while reducing user’s
opportunities to recover the data without making payment.
4 Volume Shadow Copy Service is a service provided by Microsoft
Windows which maintains regular backup of the system volume.
Most families of ransomware, such as Cerber, delete all the
backup files on the victim machine [35].
3.4.2 Installation on the infected network
Some of the ransomware families, not only infect a single
host on which they are delivered, but also distribute them-
selves to all the connected drives and target network, in order
to infect as many machines as possible. In particular, some
ransomware families have worm-like behaviour, i.e., once
dropped on a system they are able to move laterally in the
network and propagate themselves to other systems without
user intervention, e.g., through file transfer protocols, net-
work shares, etc. [119]. There are two main methods that
ransomware families adopt in order to spread through a net-
work, as we explain in the following.
Using Remote Desktop - Terminal Service Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) is often used for host to host communica-
tion over a network [120]. However, RDP is known to suffer
from many vulnerabilities (such as MS15-067 and MS15-
030), which are widely misused by attackers for remote code
execution and malicious binary payload distribution [121].
Some ransomware samples, such as Crysis, are known for
their capabilities of exploiting RDP vulnerabilities to install
themselves on the target network [122]. Another example is
Bucbi ransomware which spreads through brute force attack
on RDP [40].
Using Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol The SMB pro-
tocol is a client-server protocol used by Windows operating
system in order to share files, printers, and serial ports.
Attackers reportedly have misused SMB vulnerabilities to
remotely execute their malicious codes and get their mal-
ware spread across the network [123]. The SMB protocol has
been exploited by ransomware developers as well. For exam-
ple, HDDCryptor ransomware targets all the network shares
(e.g., files, and serial ports) using SMB [115]. The WannaCry
ransomware exploited the “EternalBlue” SMB vulnerability
to compromise Windows machines [124]. Moreover, Petya-
based ransomware (also called NotPetya) exploits two SMB
vulnerabilities, i.e., “EternalBlue” and “EternalRomance” to
infect the target network (while it also extracts victim’s cre-
dentials from memory or file system in order to spread via
Windows network shares) [125].
3.5 Command and Control (C2)
Communication with the C2 server to receive encryption key
or ransom payment details is a vital stage of a ransomware
lifecycle. In spite of differences between ransomware fam-
ilies in accessing their C2 server, following two phases are
distinguishable: (1) C2 connection before starting the encryp-
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tion in order to receive the encryption key; (2) C2 connection
after performing the encryption in order to receive ransom
payment information which should be shown to the victim.
The first phase of C2 communication is quite crucial for
those ransomware samples that use “asymmetric encryption”
and require the C2 server to generate public and private key
pairs and transfer the public key back to the victim machine
for encryption [4]. For example, the first message that Cryp-
toWall v3 receives from the C2 sever contains: (i) the payment
information uniquely generated for the victim, and (ii) a
unique public key for encrypting victim files [55]. However,
some ransomware families, such as Petya and Mischa [37],
Spora [34], and SamSam [85] locally generate symmetric
encryption keys on the infected host without communicating
with their C2 server, and use hard-coded public keys in the
malicious binary payload.
Ransomware samples leverage a variety of techniques to
find the address of the C2 server that they require to connect
to. These techniques include:
1. Hard-coded C2 IP Addresses [55]: Some ransomware
families, such as Locky [60], have a list of C2 IP addresses
hard-coded within the ransomware binary file. These ran-
somware samples are able to find and bind themselves to
their C2 servers without performing any domain search or
sending DNS queries. While hard-coding C2 IP addresses
makes these ransomware samples less noisy in terms of
generated network traffic (and so make it easier to evade
network-based ransomware detection methods), it is triv-
ial for a reverse engineer to reverse the code, find the C2
IP addresses and block them on the network gateway.
2. Using Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA): Basically
domain generation algorithms periodically and (usually)
randomly generate domain names. They use a variety of
randomization algorithms, such as pseudo-random num-
ber generators [126]. Several ransomware families, such
as Locky and GPCode, use DGAs to generate random
domain names associated with a ransomware live C2 at
a given time [4]. Periodic generation of random domain
names would make it difficult for security defenders trace
the domains and blacklist them in a timely manner. How-
ever, observation of random and unseen DNS requests
could be an evidence of a compromised host existence.
3. Using Existing Botnets: A botnet is a network of compro-
mised machines (i.e., bots) that are controlled remotely
by a C2 server [127]. Cybercriminals take advantage of
botnet in order to perform different malicious activities,
such as information theft, malware (also ransomware)
spreading, and phishing [127,128]. The C2 server of
some families of ransomware is placed on known botnets.
For example, Locky and Jaff ransomwares are delivered
on Necurs botnet [129,130], and Troldesh ransomware is
distributed through Kelihos botnet [131].
3.6 Actions on objectives
As it might be obvious, the main objective of ransomware
attacks is to receive ransom payment from the victim. Usu-
ally, upon successfully encrypting victims’ data, ransowmare
shows a message on the victim machine’s screen announcing
the infection, and providing guidelines to the victim on how
to complete the payment to recover data. However, some
ransomware families, such as CryptXXX [45], steal users’
credentials in addition to encrypting data.
The very first versions of ransomware were demanding
the ransom payment in traditional money transfer methods.
For example, GPCode ransomware asked payment via e-
gold and Liberty Reserve account [132], the Trj/SMSlock.A
ransomware demanded a premium SMS contact [133], and
TeslaCrypt ransomware (in some cases) requested ransom
payment through PayPal, or My Cash cards [134]. While,
almost all newer families of ransomware ask for ransom
payments in Bitcoin. Some ransomware families provide
facilities for the victims to pay the ransom and help the
victim in payment procedure. For example, PadCrypt ran-
somware provides the victims with live support [118], Locky
and Bart ransomware families urge users to perform the ran-
som payment through a “payment portal” [114], and Spora
ransomware provides the victim with a professional “decryp-
tion portal” (a TOR site), in which victims are needed to
provide the unique infection ID that is shown in the ran-
somware payment information note on the screen [34].
Majority of ransomware campaigns try to keep their
promise and recover back the data upon receiving ransom
payment for the sake of good reputation. However, there
were cases, such as boneidleware [135], or NotPetya ran-
somware that the attackers failed to retrieve users’ access
even after ransom payment made by the victim. In order to get
paid faster, different samples of ransomware adopt various
methods. For example, JIGSAW ransomware not only expo-
nentially increases the ransom amount as time passes by, but
also deletes users’ files permanently, and increases the num-
ber of files that can not be recovered exponentially [66]. As
another example, French Locker ransomware permanently
deletes one encrypted file every 10 minutes up until the vic-
tim settles ransom payment [136].
We believe that the ransomware features taxonomy pro-
vided in this section, provides valuable information for
researchers and developers in understanding the lifecycle
of ransomware from an intruder point of view, and corre-
spondingly proposing new defensive mechanisms against
this obtrusive malware.
4 Ransomware defence overview
Even if some ransomware “brands” have built a reputation
of maintaining the promise of giving back a decryption key,
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obviously there is no guarantee that this happens in gen-
eral. Indeed, FBI [165] reports several cases in which no
decryption key was provided even after a payment. More-
over, paying the ransom has a further drawback: as discussed
in [165], it fosters more criminals to get involved in such
a “business”. Therefore, being aware of possible protec-
tion techniques and adopting them in action becomes the
first and most important step to confine ransomware attacks.
Since there is not a method which protects 100% against ran-
somware, detection of suspicious activities on the system and
then awareness of remedial methods are of importance.
In this section, we provide a mapping between our
behavioural taxonomy and existing defensive models, e.g.,
CoA Matrix [20], to provide a ransomware defence reference
for practitioners and security analysts to adopt it in prac-
tice. We highlight possible methods for detecting, denying,
disrupting, degrading, and deceiving a ransomware attack
in each phase of the CKC (rows of the CoA matrix in
Table 2). For example, a defender could take several actions,
such as using machine learning algorithms or static analysis
of the source code, to detect ransomware while consider-
ing different weaponization techniques that we explained in
the previous section. In order to showcase the mapping of
our ransomware features taxonomy with the most suitable
countermeasures against ransomware, we provide three CoA
matrix for three ransomware families, i.e., Locky, PayCrypt
and TeslaCryp, in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. As it can
be seen there are many similarities in the type of counter-
measure that could be taken for each step. However, in some
steps, due to differences in features of each ransomware fam-
ily (refer to Table 1) different actions could be taken, e.g.,
degrading weaponization techniques in Locky and PayCrypt
could be different from TeslaCrypt.
In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview
of the existing prevention, detection and mitigation methods
in the literature. In the category of “denying/preventing”
ransomware, Luo and Liao [166] conducted one of the first
studies on the ransomware attack prevention. Their research
study basically consists of awareness and educational infor-
mation, such as defining policies and guidelines for users,
access control and management, as well as system analysis
and reports. Similar research studies, e.g., [16,85,167], have
also highlighted preventive solutions for ransomware that are
more or less the same for almost all of the malware samples,
e.g., mail security, proper firewall configuration, etc.
Compared to the first category, several research studies
in the literature are dedicated to “detecting / deceiving”
ransomware, which we briefly survey in the following. As
highlighted in [7], due to the increasing number of ran-
somware families and their various features (as we explained
in Sect. 3), it takes some time for signature-based anti-
malware/anti-virus products to detect new variants of ran-
somware. This is because anti-malware vendors need to
collect and analyse new families of ransomware continuously
and update their products with new signatures correspond-
ingly. Moreover, simply looking for a list of file names, file
extensions and file hashes would be of limited use in detec-
tion of a ransomware. Therefore, researchers advocate for
better methods to detect and disrupt ransomware activities.
Several researchers concentrated on detecting ransomware
by monitoring file system activities. In [14], Kharraz et al.
suggest monitoring of API calls, monitoring of file sys-
tem activities, and usage of decoy resources/files in order
to detect ransomware attacks. In particular, they proposed
to monitor changes in Master File Table (MFT) and type
of I/O requests in the NTFS file system to recognize suspi-
cious/known sequence of file system activities that illustrates
a ransomware attack. The paper also underlines that recovery
of the deleted files or the encryption keys would be possible
in some cases. For example, for those families of ransomware
that produce encryption keys locally on the victim machine,
the key could be extracted by inspecting the memory. More-
over, in some cases it is possible to recover the deleted data
by inspecting the MFT content. Similarly, Unveil [7], pro-
vides a dynamic analysis solution for Windows systems,
which monitors the file system I/O activities and I/O data
buffer entropy. Unveil considers several common activities
between ransomware samples (e.g., displaying a persistent
desktop message, random/selective encryption and deletion
of user files), and deploys an artificial, yet realistic, user envi-
ronment to monitor the interaction of the ransomware with
the file system. Moreover, it monitors the user desktop in
order to detect ransom note displaying, desktop-locking or
other similar ransomware-related behaviours.
In the same line of study, CryptoDrop [8] provides an
early-warning detection system by monitoring the changes
on the user data. This study proposes a ransomware detection
method based on the following file modification indicators:
large number of changes in the file type, dissimilarity mea-
sure of the same file, high Shannon entropy, high number
of file deletion, and the difference between the number of
file type a process has read and written. Similarly, [168]
provides an early detection framework utilizing behavioural
and data-centric analysis. ShieldFs [169] also proposes a
Windows kernel module in order to detect the ransomware
attack, and degrade the attack effect by recovering the orig-
inal files. Focus of the ShieldFs is on the I/O operations,
and the detection is based on entropy of write operations,
frequency of read, write, folder-listing, and renaming opera-
tions, dispersion of write operation per-file, and the file-type
access statistics. ShieldFs also detects the usage of known
cryptographic methods and injected malicious codes into a
benign process. The proposed recovery method in ShieldFs
is shadowing all the write operations, and reverting this
action as soon as detecting a malicious process. Redemp-
tion [137], similar to previous approaches, proposes a
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real-time behavioural analysis of application’s interactions
with the file system. Redemption provides an end-point
framework as well as a remedial approach (by buffering all
the files that have “write” access request). In fact, in order
to meet the data consistency requirement of benign applica-
tions, it uses two-phase commit method for write operation
on the files. The considered detection metrics include file
entropy, file overwrite, delete, and renaming operations,
folder-listing, and write access request frequency.
Compared to the previous detection methods, [170] mon-
itors network traffic to detect a ransomware attack. In par-
ticular the proposed scheme distinguishes those ransomware
samples that use DGA for C2 connection. The authors sug-
gest the use of address verification through CA (Certificate
Authority) for outgoing connections, as well as whitelisting
and blacklisting. Moreover, some researchers adopt artifi-
cial intelligence methods in detecting ransomware attack.
In [10] the authors utilize sequence pattern mining tech-
nique in order to extract ransomware features, which are then
fed to several machine learning (ML) classifiers to detect
ransomware. This work analyses file system, registry key
and DLL activities. Similarly, EldeRan [171] provides a
dynamic analysis framework using ML algorithms in order to
extract ransomware dynamic features. The extracted features
(i.e., API calls, registry key operations, file system opera-
tions, directory operations, dropped files during installation,
and strings embedded to the binary) are used later on for
classification of applications in distinguishing between ran-
somware and benign application. Instead, CloudRps [172]
proposes a cloud-based ransomware prevention and detec-
tion method relying on several monitoring components (i.e.,
server, network, and file monitoring). Each of the monitoring
components perform static and dynamic analysis considering
several behavioural features. Moreover, CloudRps provides
an independent cloud-based information backup system to
be used for file recovery in case of ransomware attack.
In contrary to the explained ransomware detection meth-
ods, some researchers focused on “deceiving” attackers by
using Honeypot [173]. Honeypots are decoy resources/files
that are deployed by the admin of a system to draw atten-
tion of attackers, and are generally used for monitoring and
detecting unauthorised access to a network or system. The
usage of honeypot could be a complement for regular net-
work monitoring solutions, not a detection method per se.
Finally, some researchers also concentrated on provid-
ing solutions to “degrade / mitigate” ransomware attacks’
effect. The first and most important solution for data recovery
is having proper backups, i.e., “multiple automatic regu-
lar properly protected backups that are not continuously
addressable through operating system calls” as reported by
ETSI [174]. Other solutions include memory investigation to
extract encryption keys [14], MFT content check to extract
the unencrypted data [14], and shadowing write operations to
undo suspicious write operations [137,169] as we explained
earlier. Furthermore, PayBreak [175] proactively mitigates
ransomware attack by securely storing all the symmetric
encryption keys in an encrypted vault (using the user’s public
key). As soon as detecting a ransomware attack, the victim
is able to decrypt the vault with her private key and restore
the encrypted files. Such a solution is efficient for those fam-
ilies of ransomware that adopt hybrid encryption methods
(see Sect. 3.1.4). In [176], authors proposed the usage of
software-defined networking (SDN) to mitigate ransomware
attacks. The method basically focuses on those families of
ransomware that adopt asymmetric encryption method, and
proposes an SDN-based traffic monitoring solution to detect
suspicious network traffic and block C2 communications,
which leads to interruption in data encryption. This method
requires pre-populated list of blaklisted proxy servers. Two
other mitigation approaches proposed in [38] for scenar-
ios that ransomware uses specific encryption methods: (i) if
ransomware uses a weak chaining mode with the cipher algo-
rithm (i.e., uses a unique key for encrypting all the files, and
also encrypts all the newly added files with the same key), the
encrypted data could be recovered; (ii) in case ransomware
uses the standard CryptoAPI, integration of a patched DLL
in order to monitor and store the secrets will mitigate ran-
somware attack.
We recall that our focus in this paper is only on ran-
somware samples that target personal computers. Several
research studies propose ransomware detection methods for
mobile devices (such as [44,177–181]) and IoT devices (such
as [9,15]) that are out of the scope of this paper.
5 Related work
In this section we provide an overview of the existing sur-
vey/taxonomy papers both in the context of ransomware and
malware in general.
During the final steps of preparing this paper we found
a survey/taxonomy research paper on success factors of
ransomware threat [182]. However, the research methodol-
ogy considered in [182] is completely different from ours
in several aspects: (1) we provide a dedicated analysis on
crypto-ransomware families attacking personal computers,
while [182] provides a general view of all kinds of ran-
somware families; (2) we provide an in-depth ransomware
feature and behaviour taxonomy explaining different phases
of a ransomware attack from an intruder point of view (based
on the CKC model), while in [182] the authors consider a tax-
onomy based on severity, platform and target of ransomware
attack, which provides a high level overview of the existing
ransomware families, but not their malicious features; and
(3) our last but not least difference with [182] is that we actu-
ally provide a systematized ransomware features taxonomy
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that was proposed as a future research direction in [182].
Other than that, several ad-hoc industrial security reports
(such as [3,21,132,183]) and a few scientific papers (such
as [14,16–18,170,172,184,185]) provide ransomware time-
line, a brief overview of ransomware structure, specification
of some of the ransomware families, and some of the existing
preventive/defensive methods.
Khattak et al. [127] present a taxonomy on Botnet
behaviour and detection. In the behaviour taxonomy of [127],
which is the most related literature study to our proposal, the
authors categorised the Botnet behaviour in five categories,
i.e., propagation, rallying, C&C, purpose, and evasion. Since
the work in [127] is a comprehensive taxonomy in the field
of Botnet, and it discusses also related work in the Bot-
net context, we omit inclusion of related work prior to
2014. Moreover, other survey papers related to Botnet, such
as [186,187], do not provide any feature taxonomy. Several
survey papers exist in different domains of malware (exclud-
ing ransomware), such as malware interaction with operating
systems [188], behavioural detection methods of malware
samples [189], behaviours of the banking malware [190],
mobile malware detection [191], and so on. While there
are some similarities between these related work and our
features taxonomy, there are two main differences: (i) as
ransomware has specific objective (i.e., gaining money by
encrypting/locking the victim data/system), we distinguish
and provide features dedicated to ransomware (mostly in
the weaponization, exploitation, installation and actions on
objectives sections of our taxonomy); and (ii) our taxonomy
is systematized based on CKC framework which makes it
easier for cyber defenders to use it as a reference for stan-
dard defensive and process models, e.g., Courses of Action
(CoA) Matrix [20], that are well-known and well-established
within the operations of many organizations.
As it can be seen, compared to the state-of-the-art
research papers, our proposed taxonomy provides an exten-
sive overview of the crypto-ransomware behavioural aspects
(those that are attacking personal computers), such that most
of the past, present and (possibly) future ransomware fami-
lies can be categorised based on this taxonomy.
6 Conclusion and future work
Ransomware attack is on the rise, and we observe a large
amount of data that are encrypted by ransomware every-
day. We believe the main barrier in defending against
ransomware is unstructured and comprehensive information
about attack vectors and vulnerabilities, as well as ran-
somware behavioural understanding. In order to shed a light
on this challenge, we proposed, to the best of our knowledge,
the first taxonomy of ransomware features. Our provided
taxonomy offers the ability to model ransomware attack
methods and allows the assessment of malicious behaviours
on as end-point devices. Such modeling could provide the
basis for subsequent attack analysis and implementation
of intrusion detection solutions and contribute in building
and implementing secure systems. Security experts envi-
sion Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
infrastructure to be the near future target of the ransomware
attackers [192], and suggest to take strict security measure in
order to prevent a hazard [193]. Moreover, attacking Internet
of Things (IoT) has been already started and there are several
samples of ransomware threatening smart IoT devices, such
as Flocker that infects smart TVs [194].
We envisage several interesting future research directions,
as follows. A valuable future research direction would be
adapting our features taxonomy with other ransomware sam-
ples, e.g., mobile ransomware or IoT ransomware, that we
did not consider in this paper. Though we anticipate that their
behavioural features would be more or less similar to what
we provide in this work. Moreover, one may try to map the
behavioural features that we extracted in this work to differ-
ent families of ransomware (similar to what we provided in
Table 1 in small scale) in order to categorise unseen samples.
However, the main challenge will be analysing different ver-
sions of the same ransomware family, i.e., several families
(such as Locky ransomware) have different versions that are
emerging day by day and change their attack methods and
features; though we would consider them belonging to the
same family!
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